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ABSTRACT 
     The era of AI-based decision-making fast approaches, and anxiety is mounting about 
when, and why, we should keep “humans in the loop” (“HITL”). Thus far, commentary has 
focused primarily on two questions: whether, and when, keeping humans involved will 
improve the results of decision-making (making them safer or more accurate), and whether, 
and when, non-accuracy-related values—legitimacy, dignity, and so forth—are vindicated by 
the inclusion of humans in decision-making. Here, we take up a related but distinct 
question, which has eluded the scholarship thus far: does it matter if humans appear to be 
in the loop of decision-making, independent from whether they actually are? In other 
words, what is at stake in the disjunction between whether humans in fact have ultimate 
authority over decision-making versus whether humans merely seem, from the outside, to 
have such authority?
     Our argument proceeds in four parts. First, we build our formal model, enriching the 
HITL question to include not only whether humans are actually in the loop of decision-
making, but also whether they appear to be so. Second, we describe situations in which the 
actuality and appearance of HITL align: those that seem to involve human judgment and 
actually do, and those that seem automated and actually are. Third, we explore instances of 
misalignment: situations in which systems that seem to involve human judgment actually do 
not, and situations in which systems that hold themselves out as automated actually rely on 
humans operating “behind the curtain.” Fourth, we examine the normative issues that result 
from HITL misalignment, arguing that it challenges individual decision-making about 
automated systems and complicates collective governance of automation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The era of automated decision making fast approaches, and anxiety is 
mounting about when and why we should keep “humans in the loop” 
(HITL).1 Thus far, commentary has focused primarily on two questions: 
whether keeping humans involved will improve the results of decision 
making (rendering those results safer or more accurate),2 and whether human 
involvement serves non-accuracy-related values like legitimacy and dignity.3 
1. See generally Meg Leta Jones, The Right to A Human in the Loop: Political Constructions of
Computer Automation and Personhood, 47 SOC. STUD. SCI. 216 (2017) (discussing the background 
on the burgeoning debate regarding whether to keep humans in the loop, particularly as it 
plays out in the United States-European Union context).  
2. Medical treatment is a good example. Rich Caruana marshals a useful case study of
asthmatic pneumonia patients who were categorized as “low risk” by a machine learning 
(ML) system—i.e., a system for automating classification tasks that infers or “learns”
decision rules from prior examples rather than applying rules explicitly coded in advance—
because it turns out that such patients (by contrast to non-asthmatic pneumonia patients)
have historically received much better care from doctors, and so have displayed correspondingly
better outcomes. In short, relying here on the ML system alone would have courted medical
disaster. But the ML system was still a very useful input to ultimately-human decisions. See
Rich Caruana et al., Intelligible Models for HealthCare: Predicting Pneumonia Risk and Hospital 30-
Day Readmission, 21 ACM SIGKDD INT’L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA 
MINING PROC. 1721, 1721–25 (2015).
3. See, e.g., Kiel Brennan-Marquez & Stephen Henderson, Artificial Intelligence and Role-
Reversible Judgment, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137 (2019) (arguing that equality requires 
a “reversibility” dynamic between decision-makers and affected parties—and that this value 
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Here, we take up a related, but distinct question which has eluded the 
scholarship thus far: does it matter if humans appear to be in the loop of 
decision making, independent from whether they actually are? In other words, 
what is at stake in the disjunction between whether humans in fact have 
ultimate authority over decision making versus whether humans merely seem, 
from the outside, to have such authority?  
Broadly speaking, our claim is that the “appearance” dimension of HITL 
merits exploration because when appearance and actuality are misaligned—
when (1) a human appears to be in the loop, but in fact the decision-making 
system is fully automated, or when (2) a decision-making system appears fully 
automated, but is in fact bolstered by back-end human judgment—two 
related sets of normative issues come to the fore.  
The first concerns individual experience. When appearance and actuality 
misalign, users of systems can become confused about what they are looking 
at. This dynamic risks both alienation and dignitary injuries, and deprives 
users of a meaningful opportunity to contest decisions.  
The second set of normative issues attends to collective governance. 
Misalignment between the appearance and actuality of full automation can 
make it difficult to assess the ultimate goal of a decision-making system. Is 
full automation actually the desired endpoint? Are we—in the democratic, 
“we the people” sense—comfortable, in principle, with the automation of a 
given realm of decision making? Misalignment frustrates our ability to 
robustly ask these questions, regardless of their correct answers. Thus, where 
the stakes of automation are obscured by either a too-human or a falsely-
inhuman veneer, democratic oversight suffers.  
Our focus on the appearance of systems joins other recent legal 
scholarship focused on deceptive interfaces and the policy implications of 
humanrobot interaction.4 Appearance emerges more latently in a good deal 
of other technology policy discussion. In fact, we might understand some of 
the most fundamental normative and policy principles in this area as efforts 
to align the actual and apparent operations of a system. Notice, for example, 
has long played a central role in policymaking around people’s relationships 
with automated systems—most notably as a means of effectuating consent to 
                                                                                                                         
runs orthogonal to decisional outcomes); Emily Berman, A Government of Laws and Not of 
Machines, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1277 (2018) (arguing likewise); Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, 
Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2019); Meg Leta Jones 
& Karen Levy, Sporting Chances: Robot Referees and the Automation of Enforcement (2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3293076 (pointing out the importance of sociocultural values 
like integrity and the overcoming of adversity in discussions of machine rule enforcement).  
 4. See, e.g., Margot Kaminski et al., Averting Robot Eyes, 76 MD. L. REV. 983 (2017); 
Kate Darling, ‘Who’s Johnny?’ Anthropomorphic Framing in Human-Robot Interaction, Integration, and 
Policy, in ROBOT ETHICS 2.0 173 (Lin et al., eds., 2017).  
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data collection.5 One of the most fundamental policy debates regarding the 
individualistic model of privacy regulation, and whether it can be 
resuscitated, involves the (in)effectiveness of privacy policies to provide 
notice that can serve as the basis for real consent.6 The goal of notice, 
essentially, is to better align public perceptions with the actual workings of 
computational systems. Recent calls for interpretability of AI-driven systems, 
and explanations of the outcomes derived from them, have similar aims.7  
Perhaps most fundamentally, appearances can help ensure the legitimacy 
of systems. Whether affected parties view decisions—particularly adverse 
decisions—as legitimate often depends on the presence of visible indicia of 
procedural regularity and fairness.8 Sometimes, we go so far as to regulate 
these indicia regardless of the characteristics of the underlying system. In 
other words, sometimes we think appearances should be safeguarded, even if 
they make no difference to the ultimate decisions reached.9 We require 
judicial recusal, for instance, both in cases where a judge is actually less-than-
impartial, and in cases where it simply appears that way. The explicit 
justification for the latter—according to the American Bar Association and 
the Supreme Court—is that “appearance of impropriety” would “impair” the 
“perception [of a] judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with 
integrity, impartiality and competence.”10 That is, it would threaten people’s 
faith in the system, regardless of its impact on the case at hand.  
Our argument proceeds in four parts. First, we build our formal model, 
enriching the HITL question to include not only whether humans are actually 
in the loop of decision making, but also whether they appear to be so. 
Second, we describe situations in which the actuality and appearance of 
HITL align: those that seem to involve human judgment and actually do, and 
those that seem automated and actually are. Third, we explore instances of 
misalignment: situations in which systems that seem to involve human 
 
 5. See generally Daniel Susser, Notice After Notice-and-Consent: Why Privacy Disclosures are 
Valuable Even If Consent Frameworks Aren’t, 9 J. INFO. POL’Y 37 (2019).  
 6. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1027 (2012) (exploring the concept of “visceral notice” as a means of 
revitalizing notice-and-consent regimes).  
 7. See generally Solon Barocas & Andrew Selbst, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable 
Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (2018). 
 8. See, e.g., TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006); John W. Meyer & Brian 
Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340 
(1977). 
 9. See Roger Ford, Privacy When Form Does Not Follow Function (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that design changes can—profitably—impact the 
experience of user interaction with technology, even if they make no difference to actual 
technological capacity).  
 10. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 888 (2009) (emphasis added).  
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judgment actually do not, and situations in which systems that hold 
themselves out as automated actually rely on humans operating “behind the 
curtain.” Fourth, we examine the normative issues that result from HITL 
misalignment.  
II. HUMANS ACTUALLY IN THE LOOP VS. APPARENTLY 
IN THE LOOP 
In recent years, the HITL question has become a focal point of 
technology-governance scholarship. This literature offers a handful of 
definitions of HITL. Some commentators construe HITL narrowly—to 
refer, in essence, to systems that operate automatically in the mine run of 
cases, but that provide for human override in circumstances of obvious 
error.11 Other commentators define HITL more expansively—to encompass 
not only the possibility of case-by-case override by humans, but also the role 
of humans in developing and supporting automated systems, and the co-
embeddedness of humans and machines in all technology-assisted decisional 
environments, “automated” or otherwise.12 Although the observation that all 
technical systems are socially constructed certainly has conceptual value, the 
observation also makes it difficult to draw meaningful lines for present 
purposes. 
In what follows, we deploy the concept of HITL to describe any 
decision-making system in which the initial triage or categorization of cases is 
performed by a machine, but a human agent exercises some degree of 
meaningful influence—up to and including override—over the disposition of 
particular cases. Influence takes different forms. Sometimes, the human role 
is largely procedural: for example, pushing a given case up or back in the 
relevant queue, or deciding which cases merit more institutional resources. 
Other times, the human role is more dispositive, involving the power to 
shape outcomes, either in terms of a case’s concrete effects (e.g., granting or 
denying benefits), or in terms of how the outcome is justified, or both. The 
specifics of the human role may vary, but the key is that a human has some 
form of meaningful discretion in particular cases.13  
 
 11. For a formal model of HITL (specifically applied to security issues, but of general 
relevance) that goes in this direction, see Lorrie F. Cranor, A Framework for Reasoning About 
The Human in the Loop, 1 CONF. ON USABILITY, PSY., & SECURITY PROC. (2008).  
 12. See, e.g., Meg Leta Ambrose, The Law and the Loop, 2014 IEEE INT’L SYMP. ON 
ETHICS SCI., TECH. & ENG’G 1 (2014) (emphasizing the universality of “humans in the 
loop,” once the category is widened to include programmers, designers, and the like). 
 13. Our framing here tracks the conception of humans in the loop in the discourse 
around the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which triggers certain 
protections when decisions are made “based solely on automated processing”—that is, in 
the absence of a human in the loop. General Data Protection Regulation, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 
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Further, when we talk about “particular cases,” we mean instances of 
decision making that have a concrete impact on a specific affected party—
making the dynamic of interest the triangulated interaction of (1) the 
automated component of the system, (2) the HITL (who gets to decide, 
ultimately, what the fate of the affected party will be), and (3) the affected 
party herself. This is a capacious definition. As a formal category, it spans a 
diverse array of decision-making domains, some of which involve lots of 
“hands-on” human involvement, others of which involve almost none. 
Sometimes, the HITL and the affected party may be the same person, as in 
decision-making systems that empower—or seem to empower—users to 
directly override machine protocols. An especially pronounced and tragic 
example of this arose recently in two crashes of the Boeing 737 Max, despite 
pilots’ efforts to override the software.14 In both cases, one could say that the 
pilots were both the affected party of the machine-system and the HITL—or 
so, at least, it appeared. 
At some level, however, the key point of our HITL definition is what it 
does not include. It does not include human involvement in the development 
of decision-making systems: the human aspects of coding, product design, or 
supervised learning. The reason is not that such human involvement lacks 
normative or practical relevance in these areas. It is that we are interested 
primarily in the impact of HITL—in actuality as well as appearance—on 
specific affected parties in decisional systems.  
Our primary contribution is to add a dimension to the HITL discussion. 
Instead of simply asking whether a human is in the loop, we focus on 
whether a human appears to be in the loop. In other words, what has been 
traditionally conceptualized as a binary question—human in the loop: “yes” 
or “no”—may be better conceived as a 2x2 matrix. Enriching the model in 
                                                                                                                         
(EU) (repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)). In discussing 
the meaning of this provision, the Article 29 Working Party Guidelines maintain that 
“fabricating human involvement”—for instance, “if someone routinely applies [machine 
decisions] without any actual influence on the result”—would not escape the ambit of the 
automated processing provision. The report further clarifies that “[t]o qualify as human 
involvement, the controller must ensure that any oversight of the decision is meaningful, 
rather than just a token gesture. It should be carried out by someone who has the authority 
and competence to change the decision.” ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING 
PARTY, GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING AND PROFILING 
FOR THE PURPOSES OF REGULATION 2016/679, 20-21/en. wp 251rev.01 (Feb. 6, 2018) 
[hereinafter GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING].  
 14. Andrew J. Hawkins, Deadly Boeing Crashes Raise Questions About Airplane Automation, 
VERGE (Mar. 15, 2019, 1:40 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/15/18267365/boeing
-737-max-8-crash-autopilot-automation [https://perma.cc/UU2L-GZ8Q]. 
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this way—moving from a simple binary to a 2x2 matrix—helps us appreciate 
some of the normative complexity that attends the HITL debate.15  
Table 1: HITL Dimensions 
 Human is in the loop Human is not in the 
loop 
Human appears to be 
in the loop 
I II 
Human does not 
appear to be in the 
loop 
III IV 
 
On Table 1, quadrants I and IV are “aligned,” meaning that the 
appearance of HITL and the actuality of HITL are the same. We call these 
quadrants manifest humanity and full automation. Quadrants II and III, by 
contrast, are “misaligned.” Quadrant II, which we call skeuomorphic humanity, 
captures situations in which it seems like a human is present, but when a 
machine actually has full control. Think here of a chatbot with advanced 
language facility, or a home care robot that “seems human” to the patients 
for whom it cares. Inversely, quadrant III, which we call faux automation, 
captures situations in which the interface makes decision making seem 
completely automated, but where a human is actually making decisions—for 
example, a mobile robot that appears self-directed, but is in fact steered by a 
remote human driver. These definitions are included in Table 2.  
  
 
 15. To be sure, while our matrix adds a dimension to the HITL/no-HITL binary, it 
also necessarily collapses some real-life complexity. Just as a human may be more or less in 
the loop—that is, humans may have different degrees of discretion or autonomy vis-a-vis an 
automated system—the appearance of HITL is also not necessarily a binary. People may 
recognize, for instance, that a HITL is present, but misperceive the HITL’s role. Or different 
users may be more or less recognizant of the true nature of the system. We elide such finer 
distinctions here for purposes of exploring the general dynamics, but recognize that they are 
likely to emerge in practice. 
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Table 2: HITL Dimensions with Definitions 
 Human is in the loop Human is not in the 
loop 
Human appears to be 
in the loop 
Manifest humanity Skeuomorphic humanity 
Human does not 
appear to be in the 
loop 
Faux automation Full automation 
 
The reality, at least for the foreseeable future, is that many domains of 
automation will not be amenable to either of the two “aligned” quadrants. 
This is so for two reasons. 
First, even in realms where total automation is plainly possible, the 
absence of humans in a process is likely to alienate some users. That is likely 
to inspire skeuomorphism, i.e., the appearance of human involvement. The 
companies and state agencies that develop automated technology, and the 
actors who deploy it, will have an incentive to use skeuomorphic techniques 
to drive adoption. Given this, it is plausible that many fully-automated realms 
will continue to maintain a veneer of human responsiveness. Techno-cultural 
evolution takes time. 
Second, total automation will not be possible in certain realms for a long 
while. But it will nonetheless serve as an aspiration, and developers of 
technology will settle for faux automation as a bridge toward full automation. 
In other words, developers will often have an incentive to market systems 
which are not fully automated, on the promise—well-founded or not—that 
they will someday achieve full automation. 
III. ALIGNMENTS 
We begin with the two quadrants in which appearance and reality are 
consistent.  
In the manifest humanity quadrant, a human is in fact in the loop, and this 
is apparent to users. Most forms of traditional adjudication fall within this 
category, as do uses of automated systems that serve purely to aid humans 
with well-established decision-making power (for example, the use of 
imaging technologies to assist doctors in medical diagnosis). 
The inverse of manifest humanity is full automation—in which a process is 
completely and obviously automated with no human role. We may accept full 
automation as the best option when enforcement is low-stakes, 
uncontroversial, and rote—when an interest in efficiency outweighs other 
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normative concerns. At the other end of the spectrum, we may prefer fully 
automated systems in particularly high-stakes allocations of costs and 
benefits (like lotteries), in which we want no actual or apparent intervening 
value judgments about desert or blameworthiness.16  
Each of these regimes may be advisable in some circumstances based on 
the values considerations we have discussed thus far (efficiency, fairness, 
safety, etc.). And both can be subject to legitimacy concerns on these or 
other grounds. We raise them here only in brief, primarily to set them aside. 
What interests us, ultimately, is the gap between appearance and reality—and 
its normative stakes.  
IV. MISALIGNMENTS 
A. SKEUOMORPHIC HUMANITY 
Quadrant II encompasses cases of skeuomorphic humanity—situations in 
which the public generally perceives meaningful human involvement where 
none exists.  
Human-like machine interfaces are ubiquitous. Sometimes, it is obvious 
to users that these machines are not actually human. Voice assistants like Siri 
and Alexa have notably human interactional qualities. They speak in 
humanoid voices, they tell jokes, and they respond to natural language 
queries. But their containment within a physical object like an iPhone or an 
Amazon Echo precludes most confusion that they are actually human. This 
is not always so. Online chatbots, for example, lack obvious indicia of their 
artificiality and often intentionally obscure it. They may do so for a variety of 
reasons, from efforts to deceive at scale (e.g., spambots and robocalls 
purporting to be from a human in need of a wire transfer) and economic and 
political manipulation (e.g., artificial generators of ratings and reviews; 
amplification of political propaganda) to therapeutic and even artistic goals 
(e.g., using bots to combat hate speech, or as a form of creative expression).17 
Google’s artificial intelligence (AI) assistant Duplex—demonstrated at a May 
2018 developer conference, in which it was used to book a haircut 
appointment—was purposefully given vocal qualities, tics and cadences that 
 
 16. This applies with particular force to intentionally randomized decisions. For 
example, Ronen Perry and Tal Zarsky discuss the attractiveness of purely random processes 
in high-stakes contexts like the law of the sea—if, say, one passenger must be thrown 
overboard to save the others, choosing the unlucky passenger by lot (presumably without 
subsequent appeal) may be the best way out of a bad situation. See Ronen Perry & Tal Z. 
Zarsky, “May the Odds Be Ever in Your Favor”: Lotteries in Law, 66 ALA. L. REV. 1035, 1041 
(2015).  
 17. See Madeline Lamo & Ryan Calo, Regulating Bot Speech, 66 UCLA L. REV. 988, 995–
1002 (2019). 
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made it seem particularly realistic (pauses, “mm-hmm”s, and the like) to keep 
the person at the other end of the line from detecting its artificiality.18 
In some cases, the skeuomorphic human is not a Siri-esque humanoid 
interface, but a real flesh-and-blood person—albeit one who lacks any 
meaningful ability to influence the relevant decision-making process. In these 
cases, the human is effectively no more than an ornamental aspect of the 
system’s interface. These dynamics emerge in technical or bureaucratic 
systems that ostensibly involve humans, but where those humans are unable 
to execute discretion or diverge from administrative scripts. Think here about 
the familiar experience of visiting the DMV and being hamstrung by a minor 
technicality: for example, being told that one’s insurance card needs to be in 
hard-copy rather than digital form in order to register a car, and that “no 
exceptions” can be made.19 In practice, a human clerk is likely to deliver the 
news that one has failed to satisfy the agency’s arcane requirements, 
suggesting that a well-reasoned or sufficiently emotional appeal might 
persuade them to revise the decision. But more often than not, the clerk 
merely throws up their hands and explains that they have no authority to 
override the rules. Although this decision-making system bears a human face, 
no human decision-maker impacts its outcomes (at least not in the immediate 
instance). 
One defense of the “human gloss” is that it can make automated systems 
more intuitively usable. We borrow here from the vocabulary of skeuomorphic 
design—the use of design features that make an artifact resemble a previous 
version of itself.20 In skeuomorphic design, the formerly functional becomes 
ornamental, a nod to prior technology that aids the user in transition.21 For 
example, the “shutter click” sound of a phone camera: though the camera no 
longer has a physical shutter that makes such a sound, users have become 
 
 18. Interestingly, following blowback from critics about Duplex’s deceptiveness, 
Google announced that a subsequent version would explicitly identify itself as an AI to the 
humans with whom it interacts. See Nick Statt, Google Now Says Controversial AI Voice Calling 
System Will Identify Itself to Humans, VERGE (May 10, 2018, 7:46 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/10/17342414/google-duplex-ai-assistant-voice-calling-
identify-itself-update [https://perma.cc/5RFU-S876]. 
 19. Readers who live in Connecticut be advised. In fairness to the state, DMV 
paperwork requirements were recently relaxed—registration applicants are now permitted to 
submit digital insurance cards. Though this, of course, does not make the system any more 
human; it simply makes the inhuman system more forgiving. An Act Concerning Electronic 
Proof of Automobile insurance identification cards, H.B. 5135, 2017 Sess. (Conn. 2009), 
https://www.cga.ct.gov/asp/cgabillstatus/cgabillstatus.asp?selBillType=Bill&which_year=
2017&bill_num=5135 [https://perma.cc/C5EE-8NF4].  
 20. Skeuomorphism, INTERACTION DESIGN FOUND., https://www.interaction-
design.org/literature/topics/skeuomorphism [https://perma.cc/29WA-JUXU] (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2019).  
 21. See id.  
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acclimated to the idea that shutter click indicates a photo taken. Therefore, 
subsequent technologies have included the sound as an ornament. The 
ornament retains social functionality by acting as a signifier, a notification to 
photo takers and photo subjects that a photo has been captured.22 (Think, 
too, of e-readers with “pages,” or digital audio controls shaped like dials.23)  
We might think of skeuomorphism as a form of design theater.24 
Interaction with artifacts and processes often involves a sort of ritualism; our 
understanding of technologies depends on how we have interacted with 
them in the past. When something about the technology changes in a way 
that obviates that ritual, we may be put off or confused. The retention of 
ritual—even when not strictly necessary for the system to function 
technically—can help the system to function socially. Consider, for instance, 
the legend of midcentury cake mix.25 As the story goes, home cake mixes—in 
which all ingredients save water were pre-measured and mixed together, so 
that the baker need only dump the box’s contents into water, stir, and 
bake—initially sold poorly. Psychologist Ernest Dichter recommended that 
General Mills reformulate the mix to require more human work. The reason, 
Dichter offered, was that housewives found the process self-indulgent: “In 
order to enjoy the emotional rewards of presenting a homemade cake, they 
had to be persuaded that they had really baked it, and such an illusion was 
impossible to maintain if they did virtually nothing.”26 As a result, it is said, 
the company changed the recipe to require that the baker add fresh eggs to 
the mix in place of the dehydrated eggs that had been included. This change 
ostensibly led to the product’s wide acceptance. The story suggests that even 
when not essential for technical functioning, the patina of humanity in a 
process can matter. 
 Further, even in realms where we are comfortable with full automation 
as a normative matter—i.e., the decision-making task is not one that seems, 
 
 22. See John H. Blitz, Skeuomorphs, Pottery, and Technological Change, 117 AM. 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 665, 668 (2015) (describing skeuomorphs as both “utilitarian and 
representational”); see also Ivan Markovi?, Vaping Like a Chimney: Skeuomorphic Assemblages and 
Post-Smoking Geographies, SOC. & CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 1, 2 (2019) (presenting a conceptual 
overview of the skeuomorph). 
 23. See Tim Hwang & Karen Levy, The Presentation of Machine in Everyday Life, WEROBOT 
(Mar. 2015), http://www.werobot2015.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Hwang_Levy_
WeRobot_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6CU-TLYR]. 
 24. Id.  
 25. The minutiae of the story itself are contested, and possibly apocryphal, but it serves 
its purpose here regardless. See David Mikkelson, Requiring an Egg Made Instant Cake Mixes 
Sell?, SNOPES (Jan. 31, 2008), https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/something-eggstra/ 
[https://perma.cc/8EAC-BGZL].  
 26. PAUL LEE TAN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 7700 ILLUSTRATIONS: SIGNS OF THE TIMES 
1228 (1979).  
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in principle, to require human judgment—there may be still be dignitary 
reasons to maintain the appearance of humanity, even in a purely ministerial 
capacity. A good example is the delivery of momentous information, as in 
recent debates over whether doctors should deliver grave prognoses via 
robot.27 Many people think that dire medical information deserves some kind 
of “cushion,” or human gloss, which might be a freestanding argument for 
keeping the skeuomorphic structure in place.28 It is also possible for the 
appearance of human involvement to help smoothly transition a decision-
making system to full automation. This is not an argument in favor of 
maintaining skeuomorphic structures perpetually, but can certainly justify 
maintaining them in the short- to medium-term.29 Acknowledging these 
benefits is quite different from wanting a human to actually be meaningfully 
involved in decision making.30 The objection here is not to the means of 
arriving at the prediction, but to the method by which that prediction is 
communicated. 
Design of this sort is not without detractors. Although some preferences 
are purely aesthetic, others depend on design theater’s tendency to enable 
deception or manipulation, when users are made to feel comfortable with a 
new technology because they think it works just like an older one.31 Often, 
design theaters operate to give users the feeling of being in greater control 
over a technology than they actually are (what we have elsewhere called 
 
 27. See David Aaro, Family Upset After ‘Robot’ Doctor Informs Patient He Doesn’t Have Long 
to Live, FOX NEWS (Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/health/family-upset-after-
robot-doctor-says-patient-doesnt-have-long-to-live [https://perma.cc/M6WH-UYT7] (“ ‘If 
you’re coming to tell us normal news, that’s fine, but if you’re coming to tell us there’s no 
lung left and we want to put you on a morphine drip until you die, it should be done by a 
human being and not a machine,’ Catherine Quintana told USA Today.”); Evan Selinger & 
Arthur Caplan, How Physicians Should and Shouldn’t Talk with Dying Patients, ONEZERO (Mar. 
12, 2019), https://onezero.medium.com/how-physicians-should-and-shouldnt-talk-with-
dying-patients-6ff55fcf40e4 [https://perma.cc/C39F-NS89]; Joel Zivot, In Defense of Telling 
Patients They’re Dying via Robot, SLATE (Mar. 13, 2019), https://slate.com/technology/2019/
03/robot-doctor-technology-patient-dying.html [https://perma.cc/8CFT-R3PP]. Notably, 
the human doctor did appear on the robot’s screen and delivered the news via 
videoconference—but the means of communication nevertheless caused injury and offense. 
 28. See Zivot, supra note 27. 
 29. Katherine Metcalf et al., Mirroring to Build Trust in Digital Assistants, ARXIV (Apr. 2, 
2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1904.01664.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NBJ-A8DF]. 
 30. Brennan-Marquez & Henderson, supra note 3. 
 31. A somewhat comical, but instructive example is the “Horsey Horseless,” a turn-of-
the-19th-century vehicle design that consisted, essentially, of “a car with a big wooden horse 
head stuck on the front of it,” intended to mislead horses on the road into accepting a 
motorized vehicle as one of their own. It does not appear to have worked. Alex Davies, Well 
That Didn’t Work: The 1899 Car With a Full-Size Wooden Horse Head Stuck to the Front, WIRED 
(Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/02/well-didnt-work-1899-car-full-size-
wooden-horse-head-stuck-front/ [https://perma.cc/ZU57-GFD5].  
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“theaters of volition”)—like placebo buttons that give users the illusion of 
agency over elevator doors or crosswalk signals.32 Speed is another common 
consideration: users may not trust computational processes that occur 
instantaneously, so designers may deliberately build delay and the appearance 
of deliberation or processing into systems.33 Cases like these deceive users by 
deliberately obscuring the full capabilities of the system and the limited 
abilities of the human user. 
Sometimes the concern is less about deception than visceral aversion. 
Human-like machines launch us into the uncanny valley—things that look 
almost, but not quite, like humans make us feel very uncomfortable.34 There 
are several different explanations for this feeling of eeriness. One cognitive 
explanation is that when it is harder for us to categorize something 
immediately, we have a sense of dissonance and discomfort that is difficult to 
resolve. An explanation from evolutionary psychology is that vaguely 
unnatural movement can be an indicator of pathogens, so we are conditioned 
to want to stay away from it.35 Regardless of the source, being duped by a 
machine masquerading as a human is an uncomfortable feeling. 
More pragmatic concerns attach, too. Human-seeming systems can 
readily gain our trust—or manipulate us, leading to a range of consumer 
protection issues.36 We may disclose more to human-seeming systems than 
we otherwise might, perhaps because we have misread human-like cues.37 
The mistaken sense that a human is involved in an automated process can 
lead people to believe that there are more opportunities for intervention and 
override than actually exist. Ultimately—as we explore more fully in Part IV 
below—the key question is whether maintaining the appearance of human 
involvement has sufficient benefits to outweigh the inherent shortcomings of 
deception.38  
 
 32. Hwang & Levy, supra note 23; Torin Monahan, Built to Lie: Investigating Technologies of 
Deception, Surveillance, and Control, 32 INFO. SOC’Y 229 (2016). 
 33. See Ryan W. Buell & Michael I. Norton, The Labor Illusion: How Operational 
Transparency Increases Perceived Value, 57 MGMT. SCI. 1564 (2011). 
 34. See Shensheng Weng et al., The Uncanny Valley: Existence and Explanations, 19 REV. 
GEN. PSYCHOL. 393 (2015).  
 35. Karl F. MacDorman et al., Too Real for Comfort? Uncanny Responses to Computer 
Generated Faces, 25 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 695, 696 (2009). 
 36. See generally Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, 74 MD. L. REV. 785 
(2015). 
 37. Brenda Leong & Evan Selinger, Robot Eyes Wide Shut: Understanding Dishonest 
Anthropomorphism, 19 ACM FAT CONF. ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 
299, 299 (2019). 
 38. See generally Eytan Adar et al., Benevolent Deception in Human Computer Interaction, 13 
ACM CONF. ON HUMAN COMPUTER INTERACTION (CHI) (2013) (providing a thorough 
description of rationales and methods for user deception in human-computer interaction).  
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B. FAUX AUTOMATION 
Quadrant III points to the inverse of skeuomorphic humanity—what is 
sometimes called faux automation (or what writer and activist Astra Taylor calls 
fauxtomation).39 Here, the misalignment between appearance and reality arises 
because apparently automated systems are in fact driven by considerable 
human input. Of course, as scholars in science and technology studies (STS) 
have long argued, at some level, all technologies reflect the concerns, 
perspectives, and values of their human designers.40 By faux automation, 
however, we suggest more direct forms of human involvement, consistent 
with our definition of HITL above.  
The reason for faux automation is straightforward: building fully 
automated systems is hard. Despite recent advances in machine learning and 
AI, certain tasks that humans easily accomplish, such as understanding and 
using words in context, remain difficult for computers.41 Rather than wait for 
further breakthroughs, technologists increasingly conceive of automation 
problems outside binary, all-or-nothing terms (full automation or bust), and 
use hybrid human-machine workflows to solve complex problems. Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (AMT) system, a major platform for coordinating such 
work, originally described itself as facilitating “artificial artificial intelligence”: 
a simulacrum of automation, in which humans masquerade as machines that 
think like humans.42  
Examples of faux automation abound, exhibiting a variety of human-
machine configurations. In some arrangements, machines do most of the 
work and human involvement is largely limited to quality assurance. For 
example, it was recently revealed that Amazon’s Alexa devices—voice-
activated “smart assistants” advertised as using AI to answer users’ questions 
 
 39. Astra Taylor, The Automation Charade, LOGIC (Aug. 1, 2018), https://logicmag.io/
05-the-automation-charade/ [https://perma.cc/2YCJ-2MCM]. 
 40. See, e.g., Ambrose, supra note 12; see generally BATYA FRIEDMAN & DAVID G. 
HENDRY, VALUE-SENSITIVE DESIGN: SHAPING TECHNOLOGY WITH MORAL IMAGINATION 
(2019). 
 41. Will Knight, AI’s Language Problem, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 9, 2016), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602094/ais-language-problem [https://perma.cc/
38ZZ-XJKZ]. 
 42. Using AMT, “requestors” distribute small work assignments (“Human Intelligence 
Tasks,” or HITs, as Amazon calls them)—e.g., identifying objects in an image or digitizing 
handwritten text—to a distributed, online workforce (“turkers”), who are paid per task 
completed. Artificial Artificial Intelligence, ECONOMIST (Jun. 10, 2006), 
https://www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2006/06/10/artificial-artificial-
intelligence?story_id=7001738 [https://perma.cc/N4KT-FW5B].  
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and to control other “smart home” systems—fall into this category.43 
Unbeknownst to Alexa owners, who were given the impression that the 
devices are fully automated, audio recordings of user prompts and queries are 
regularly transmitted back to Amazon, where human technicians review them 
in order to tweak and improve Alexa’s algorithms.44 
At the other end of the spectrum are cases in which humans do most of 
the thinking and machine components are largely for show. One example is 
the original Mechanical Turk, an 18th century chess-playing automaton that 
turned out to have a human chess player hidden inside its enclosure. These 
systems are designed to give the appearance of automation without the 
computational substance.45 In 2015, the public learned that the Edison 
automated blood testing systems sold by Silicon Valley firm Theranos were 
just this kind of charade.46 Theranos advertised its Edison machines as a 
revolutionary technology that could process hundreds of diagnostic tests 
using only a few drops of blood instead of the numerous vials older 
techniques required. But the machines did not work.47 Rather than admit it, 
the company staged misleading demonstrations and falsified Food and Drug 
Administration tests. The company pretended that its own machines were 
processing the blood, when lab technicians were actually conducting the tests 
behind the scenes using standard industry equipment purchased from their 
competitors.48 
Many faux automated systems rely on human-machine collaborations 
that fall somewhere between these extremes. While significant functionality is 
automated, humans are generally responsible for tasks such as text and image 
recognition. In 2017, it came to light that Expensify (an app for generating 
expense reports) was using human workers contracted through AMT to 
digitize handwritten receipts.49 In 2018, the Center for Public Integrity 
exposed widespread errors in campaign finance records caused by human 
mislabeling of images being prepared for automated processing by a 
 
 43. Matt Day et al., Amazon Workers Are Listening to What You Tell Alexa, BLOOMBERG 
(Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-10/is-anyone-
listening-to-you-on-alexa-a-global-team-reviews-audio [https://perma.cc/92KW-M4AD]. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Taylor, supra note 39.  
 46. John Carreyrou, Hot Startup Theranos Has Struggled With Its Blood-Test Technology, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/theranos-has-struggled-with-
blood-tests-1444881901 [https://perma.cc/K6G7-WWLU]. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Alison Griswold, Expensify’s “Smart” Scanning Technology Was Secretly Aided by Humans, 
QUARTZ (Nov. 30, 2017), https://qz.com/1141695/startup-expensifys-smart-scanning-tech
nology-used-humans- hired-on-amazon-mechanical-turk/ [https://perma.cc/4WR6-9TKA].  
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company called Captricity.50 Even more difficult for machines than text and 
image recognition is judging the meaning of words and images in context. 
This makes human workers essential to commercial content moderation.51 
While Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg has promised that the company’s AI 
tools will rid its platform of problematic content, there is little reason to 
believe fully automated content moderation systems are on the horizon.52 
Facebook and other social media sites, such as Twitter and YouTube, have 
devised elaborate rules for determining when user-generated content should 
be flagged or removed—systems that Kate Klonick has likened to “legal or 
governance systems.”53 But in many cases, machines are incapable of 
determining which rules apply to particular posts, or deciding when the rules 
need to be revised or amended.54 Thus, armies of human reviewers are 
required to carry out this interpretive work.55 
Humans may also play a significant role in seemingly autonomous 
robotic systems. The Kiwibot, a four-wheeled food delivery robot currently 
deployed for testing on the UC Berkeley campus, is actually operated by 
workers in Colombia who send the robots wayfinding instructions every five 
to ten seconds. (The arrangement, which the company calls “parallel 
autonomy,” saves money because the humans obviate the need for 
sophisticated sensor systems).56 Similarly, a Japanese firm called Mira 
Robotics recently announced the release of remote-controlled “robot 
butlers” (think Rosie from The Jetsons). These robots rely on a combination of 
AI software for basic navigation and remote human controllers for more 
 
 50. Rosie Cima, Company Using Foreign Workers Botches U.S. Senate Campaign Finance 
Records, CTR. FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Sep. 5, 2018), https://publicintegrity.org/federal-
politics/company-using-foreign-workers-botches-u-s-senate-campaign-finance-records/ 
[https://perma.cc/G6XP-G7EN].  
 51. Sarah T. Roberts, Social Media’s Silent Filter, ATLANTIC (Mar. 8, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/03/commercial-content-
moderation/518796/ [https://perma.cc/W9K4-PAV9] (“[T]here is a profound human 
aspect to this work.”).  
 52. Drew Harwell, AI Will Solve Facebook’s Most Vexing Problems, Mark Zuckerberg Says. 
Just Don’t Ask When or How., WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04/11/ai-will-solve-
facebooks-most-vexing-problems-mark-zuckerberg-says-just-dont-ask-when-or-how/ 
[https://perma.cc/G2FJ-2CBG].  
 53. See Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online 
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1602 (2018). 
 54. Id. at 1635–49. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Carolyn Said, Kiwibots Win Fans at UC Berkeley As They Deliver Fast Food at Slow 
Speeds, S.F. CHRON. (May 26, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/
Kiwibots-win-fans-at-UC-Berkeley-as-they-deliver-13895867.php [https://perma.cc/583D-
WXDC]. 
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complex tasks like folding clothes and manipulating small objects.57 Although 
Mira Robotics has been forthright about its robots’ human control, as these 
kinds of devices proliferate we can expect the gap between user perceptions 
about the nature of these systems and the reality of their internal functioning 
to grow. 
Faux automation and skeuomorphic humanity are not mutually exclusive: 
one system can exhibit both dynamics. Consider Google’s Duplex service, 
previously described. Originally debuted as “a new technology for 
conducting natural conversations to carry out ‘real world’ tasks over the 
phone,” the system was designed as an outward-facing AI assistant.58 Rather 
than merely answer questions, it could call and schedule reservations and 
appointments, speaking to other people on its user’s behalf.59 In Google’s 
initial demonstrations, Duplex did not disclose to the people it called that 
they were speaking to a machine—a case of skeuomorphic humanity—and 
skeptics quickly raised alarms about the deception involved.60 But a more 
complex revelation followed: Duplex’s algorithms required significant human 
help in order to function. Confronted by the New York Times, Google 
admitted that “about 25 percent of calls placed through Duplex started with 
a human, and that about 15 percent of those that began with an automated 
system had a human intervene at some point.”61 Faux automation was thus 
used as a stop-gap on the way to skeuomorphic humanity—a human 
pretending to be a machine, while the machine pretended to be a human. 
The illusion of automation gives rise to at least two distinct concerns. 
First, there may be contexts in which we would welcome machine assistance, 
but balk at human help. Smart speakers are designed to record us in what was 
 
 57. James Vincent, Robot Butlers Operated by Remote Workers are Coming to Do Your Chores, 
VERGE (May 9, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/9/18538020/home-robot-
butler-telepresence-ugo-mira-robotics [https://perma.cc/9AJY-343T]. 
 58. Yaniv Leviathan & Yossi Matias, Google Duplex: An AI System for Accomplishing Real-
World Tasks Over the Phone, GOOGLE AI BLOG (May 8, 2018), https://ai.googleblog.com/
2018/05/duplex-ai-system-for-natural-conversation.html [https://perma.cc/6BTD-ABVZ]. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See, e.g., Brian Feldman, Google Duplex Makes Your Life Easier by Making It More 
Difficulty for Others, N.Y. MAG. (May 10, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/05/
google-duplex-no-no-no-no-no-no.html [https://perma.cc/P5RN-9RPK]; Alex Hern, 
Google’s ‘Deceitful’ AI Assistant to Identify Itself as a Robot During Calls, GUARDIAN (May 11, 
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/may/11/google-duplex-ai-identify-
itself-as-robot-during-calls [https://perma.cc/6W42-3F6K]; Natasha Lomas, Duplex Shows 
Google Failing at Ethical and Creative AI Design, TECHCRUNCH (May 10, 2018), 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/05/10/duplex-shows-google-failing-at-ethical-and-creative-
ai-design/[https://perma.cc/F2HV-J48C].  
 61. Brian X. Chen & Cade Metz, Google’s Duplex Uses A.I. to Mimic Humans (Sometimes), 
N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/technology/
personaltech/ai-google-duplex.html [https://perma.cc/H9WJ-9DFL].  
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once called the privacy of our own homes, and Amazon markets some of its 
Alexa devices, such as the “Echo Spot” smart alarm clock, for installation in 
the bedroom.62 Yet those comfortable with having their intimate 
conversations monitored by Amazon’s algorithms may feel differently about 
having them heard by human listeners.63 This concern has also been raised in 
relation to robots: if people are “deceived into thinking the robot is acting 
autonomously” rather than being human-controlled, they may “disclose 
sensitive information to the robot that they would not tell a human, not 
realizing that a human is hearing everything they say.”64 This was equally true 
in the Expensify case, discussed above. Expensify users, under the 
impression that machines were digitizing their receipts, were dismayed to 
learn that human AMT workers read and transcribed them, as receipts often 
contain sensitive personal information.65  
Second, the appearance of automation can disguise the mistreatment of 
human workers behind the scenes.66 Work managed through AMT is not 
typically well-paid. While Amazon does not provide precise wage figures, 
estimates suggest that “turkers” (i.e., AMT workers) earn on average only $2 
per hour.67 In addition to wage issues, the nature of the work can be 
distressing and damaging. Researchers and journalists have chronicled the 
gruesome text, images, and videos that commercial content moderators must 
endure in order to purge such content from our social media feeds, and the 
inadequate support tech companies often provide them.68 Yet much of this 
 
 62. Tom Warren, Amazon’s Echo Spot is a Sneaky Way to Get a Camera Into Your Bedroom, 
VERGE (Sep. 28, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/28/16378472/amazons-echo-
spot-camera-in-your-bedroom [https://perma.cc/W26A-PZWY].  
 63. Hartzog, supra note 36, at 794. 
 64. Jacqueline Kory Westlund & Cynthia Breazeal, Deception, Secrets, Children, and Robots: 
What’s Acceptable?, HUM. ROBOT INTERACTION WORKSHOPS (2015).  
 65. Griswold, supra note 49. 
 66. Taylor, supra note 39. 
 67. Kotaro Hara et al., A Data-Driven Analysis of Workers’ Earnings on Amazon Mechanical 
Turk, 18 ACM CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYS. 11 (2018) (“We estimate that 
96% of workers on AMT earn below the U.S federal minimum wage. While requesters are 
paying $11.58/h on average, dominant requesters who post many low-wage HITs like 
content creation tasks are pulling down the overall wage distribution.”). Additionally, 
Kiwibot operators also make less than $2 per hour. Said, supra note 56. 
 68. Sarah T. Roberts, Social Media’s Silent Filter, ATLANTIC (Mar. 8, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/03/commercial-content-
moderation/518796/ [https://perma.cc/NDS5-9ZQE]; Sarah T. Roberts, Meet the People 
Who Scar Themselves to Clean Up Our Social Media Networks, MACLEAN’S (Jun. 15, 2018), 
https://www.macleans.ca/opinion/meet-the-people-who-scar-themselves-to-clean-up-our-
social-media-networks/ [https://perma.cc/R6V7-DHEP]; Adrian Chen, The Human Toll of 
Protecting the Internet from the Worst of Humanity, NEW YORKER (Jan. 28, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/the-human-toll-of-protecting-the-
internet-from-the-worst-of-humanity [https://perma.cc/PYP4-29NU]. 
2019] STRANGE LOOPS 763 
 
work is rendered invisible, because users are led to believe that these systems 
are fully automated.69 
V. HOW MISALIGNMENT UNDERMINES REASONING 
ABOUT AUTOMATION  
The misalignments described in the previous section provoke normative 
worry both at the individual and institutional levels. Beneath both sets of 
problems lies the same fundamental issue: misalignment sows confusion. It 
undermines our capacity to understand and reason about automated systems. 
For individuals, misalignment makes it difficult to contest or resist the 
decisions these systems deliver. For institutions, misalignment frustrates 
governance; it hinders the public’s ability to discern and meaningfully balance 
the benefits and harms of automation.  
These problems manifest differently in cases of skeuomorphic humanity 
and in cases of faux automation. In cases involving skeuomorphic humanity, 
individuals confronting human-seeming, but in fact fully automated systems 
have no real opportunity for appeal. The human acts as a bait-and-switch, 
palliating users’ concerns without offering real recourse. Consider again the 
case of a DMV agent who refuses to deviate from their administrative script, 
even when the decision it reaches is arguably unreasonable. Set at ease by a 
human veneer, we expect that a human—with the apparent power to 
intervene or override the system’s rote determination—will hear our 
grievances. Instead we find that resistance is futile.70  
In cases of faux automation, by contrast, misalignment misdirects, rather 
than thwarts, our attempts at contesting the system’s judgments. For 
example, if users are given the impression that content moderation on a 
social media platform has been fully automated, when in fact it is carried out 
in large part by an army of human reviewers, they are misled about the 
 
 69. See generally MARY GRAY & SIDDHARTH SURI, GHOST WORK: HOW TO STOP 
SILICON VALLEY FROM BUILDING A NEW GLOBAL UNDERCLASS (2019).  
 70. Ben Wagner points out that apparent-but-not-actual HITL (what he terms quasi-
automation, and what we call skeuomorphic humanity) can frustrate the aims of legal rules, as 
well. Laws that aim to promote human rights with respect to algorithmic decision-making 
(notably, the GDPR) assume that HITLs have some measure of agency and influence; if they 
do not, they amount to no more than “a human fig-leaf for automated decisions” that 
cannot adequately safeguard rights. Ben Wagner, Liable, But Not in Control? Ensuring 
Meaningful Human Agency in Automated Decision-Making Systems, 11 POL’Y & INTERNET 104, 
118 (2019). Wagner proposes seven criteria through which to define when a human is 
meaningfully in the loop, as opposed to when one is simply present to “rubber-stamp” 
automated decisions. Id. at 115. 
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source of problems.71 Rather than focusing indignation on the human 
process that caused the mistake, people tend to lodge their grievances against 
automation. This result verges on ironic, since genuine automation may well 
be a solution to the problem (depending on our diagnosis of what the 
problem is), rather than its cause.  
Similar issues arise at the collective or institutional level. To the extent 
that decision-making systems are performing sub-optimally, misalignment 
distorts our impression of the problem. Specifically, misalignment between 
the appearance and reality of human control over decision making can cause 
certain normative dynamics to become ambiguous or insufficiently 
differentiated. This is unfortunate for at least two reasons. First, different 
dynamics, once identified, raise different governance issues. Ambiguities 
between dynamics therefore produce a risk of solutions that poorly fit, or 
even disserve, the problem at hand. Second, the question of what dynamic 
we are confronting—the nature of the problem—will often be a source of 
normative controversy in its own right. In other words, there are many 
circumstances in which no “right answer” exists to the question of which 
dynamic is afoot. Rather, the issue is essentially and irreducibly political, such 
that even the question of how to conceptualize the problem calls out for 
democratic oversight.  
To get a better sense of what we mean, consider each of the following 
dynamics, grouped according to which form of misalignment—
skeuomorphic humanity or faux automation—they reflect. In each, we 
consider how normative issues can emerge based on the ideal calibration, in 
terms of the appearance and actuality of human involvement, for a given 
decision-making system. 
A. DYNAMICS RELATED TO SKEUOMORPHIC HUMANITY 
1. The first dynamic is that, ideally, a decision-making system would both 
be and appear automated—but at present it appears non-automated. 
  
 
 71. See James Vincent, AI Won’t Relieve the Misery of Facebook’s Human Moderators, VERGE 
(Feb. 17, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/27/18242724/facebook-moderation-
ai-artificial-intelligence-platforms [https://perma.cc/2VPX-E5VQ]. 
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Table 3: Unrealized Ideal—Full Automation 
 Human is in the loop Human is not in the 
loop 
Human appears to be 
in the loop 
 PRESENT STATUS 
QUO (skeuomorphic 
humanity) 
Human does not 
appear to be in the 
loop 
 UNREALIZED 
IDEAL (full 
automation) 
 
Here, the skeuomorphic quadrant is essentially an interim position: the 
problem is not that the decision-making system is insufficiently automated, 
but that it looks insufficiently automated. And once again the key governance 
issue becomes whether it is possible—and desirable—to move toward a 
greater appearance, or awareness, of automation. When the answer is yes, the 
practical question becomes how best to facilitate the transition: by what 
means, on what timetable, at whose cost, and the like. Proposed chatbot 
disclosure laws are a good example of an effort to move in this direction.72 
By requiring overt disclosure of the machine nature of a chatbot, the user is 
presumably not deceived into believing she is communicating with a human, 
and can modulate her behavior accordingly.73  
2. The second dynamic is that, ideally, a decision-making system would 
neither appear to be, nor actually be fully automated, but at present it is 
automated.  
  
 
 72. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Neuburger & Daryn A. Grossman, Get All of Your Bots in a Row: 
2018 California Bot Disclosure Law Comes Online Soon, NAT’L L. REV. (June 7, 2019), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/get-all-your-bots-row-2018-california-bot-
disclosure-law-comes-online-soon [https://perma.cc/98X8-6M72].  
 73. But see Lamo & Calo, supra note 17, at 6 (noting that even if bots are revealed as 
bots, they “can [still] cause harm, primarily by tricking and confusing consumers. 
Robocallers may deny that they are automated, call targeted individuals repeatedly, and even 
claim to be a representative of the IRS or another powerful entity that even a tech-savvy 
individual might feel too anxious to hang up on”). 
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Table 4: Unrealized Ideal—Manifest Humanity 
 Human is in the 
loop 
Human is not in the loop 
Human appears to be 
in the loop 
UNREALIZED 
IDEAL (manifest 
humanity) 
PRESENT STATUS QUO 
(skeuomorphic humanity) 
Human does not 
appear to be in the 
loop 
  
 
The governance questions on this front are straightforward in theory, but 
often complex in practice. In principle, the issue is simply one of putting a 
human “back” into the loop—a reversion to the pre-automated world. But in 
practice, at least two wrinkles emerge. The first is that reversion is often 
costly, and directly contrary to the economic interests of the actors, 
governmental or corporate, who spearheaded the effort toward automation 
in the first place. So, at a minimum, significant political will is required. The 
second wrinkle is that even those who agree about the need to reinsert a 
human in the loop will likely dispute how to do so. At what point(s) in the 
process should human oversight be installed? And what kind of oversight? 
And—as ever—which humans? These issues may emerge particularly when 
the combination of automation and deception removes some socially 
important friction. For instance, while bot disclosure laws require a change in 
the appearance of a chatbot, proposed anti-robocall legislation takes a different 
tack by banning certain types of automated calling altogether.74 Doing so 
makes direct marketing much costlier for companies making these calls, and 
presumably realigns their incentives to do so. 
3. The third dynamic is that, ideally, a decision-making system would be 
automated, but not seem so, making the skeuomorphic quadrant not simply 
an interim state, but a direct realization of the ideal.  
  
 
 74. Emily Birnbaum, Dem Chair Offers Bill to Crack Down on Robocalls, HILL (Feb. 4, 
2019), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/428372-dem-introduces-bill-to-crack-down-
on-robocalls [https://perma.cc/X399-UDMU]. 
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Table 5: Realized Ideal 
 Human is in the loop Human is not in the loop 
Human appears to be 
in the loop 
 PRESENT STATUS QUO 
& REALIZED IDEAL 
(skeuomorphic humanity) 
Human does not 
appear to be in the 
loop 
  
 
A good illustration of this dynamic is a care-bot that assists ill and elderly 
people.75 Assuming for argument’s sake that at least some care functions are 
susceptible to automation, it does not follow that “full automation” is the 
ideal paradigm. For it may be that other, countervailing considerations—for 
example, the psychological benefits that come from being cared for in a 
human-feeling way—may counsel in favor of continued, even perpetual, 
skeuomorphism. Indeed, this is precisely why many skeuomorphs exist: they 
lubricate the transition from Technological Environment A to Technological 
Environment B for the human subjects who occupy, and interact within, 
those environments. Sometimes, this process is self-consciously temporary. 
Other times, it can be indefinite, particularly when the skeuomorph evolves 
into a comfortable feature of Technological Environment B, despite its lack 
of functional purpose. Think, for instance, of the persistent use of “buttons” 
in UX design. There is no functional reason that screen-based interfaces 
must include button-shaped mechanisms of navigation. Yet people seem to 
like them, and understand how to use them, and it is therefore conceivable 
that they will persist for a long time to come.  
Yet even in this case—despite the status quo overlapping formally with 
the ideal—many second-order governance questions remain. What are the 
goals of the skeuomorphic mechanism and how do they potentially trade off 
against other goals? Having answered that question to satisfaction, what are 
the specific design features of the skeuomorphic mechanism that best 
balance these goals? 
B. DYNAMICS RELATED TO FAUX AUTOMATION 
The possible dynamics with respect to faux automation form a mirror-
image of those just explored.  
 
 75. Don Lee, Desperate for Workers, Aging Japan Turns to Robots for Health Care, SEATTLE 
TIMES (Jul. 30, 2019), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/desperate-for-workers-aging-
japan-turns-to-robots-for-health-care/ [https://perma.cc/X5FL-NVMM]. 
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1. The first dynamic is that, ideally, a decision-making system would both 
seem and be fully automated—but at present only seems automated, without 
actually being so.  
Table 6: Unrealized Ideal—Full Automation 
 Human is in the loop Human is not in the 
loop 
Human appears to be 
in the loop 
  
Human does not 
appear to be in the 
loop 
PRESENT STATUS 
QUO (faux automation)    
UNREALIZED IDEAL 
(full automation) 
 
This gives rise to two interrelated governance questions: (1) whether it is 
possible or realistic, given existing technology, to move toward actual 
automation, and (2) what the drawbacks of doing so would be. In other 
words, as with the equivalent dynamic above, here the faux automation 
quadrant is an interim state. Although full automation is the ideal, the status 
quo involves faux automation—and the question becomes whether it is 
possible (and, all things considered, desirable) to move toward the former. 
Certain compliance functions are likely to fall in this category. Consider 
the Captricity example explored above. One might plausibly argue that it 
would be desirable to audit office-holders’ financial data via a fully automated 
solution. But even so, because that ideal is not yet technologically possible, it 
becomes a matter of obvious public concern and accountability what types of 
shadow adjustments are taking place—at the behest of humans—behind the 
scenes.76 
Temporary “bootstrapping” of human labor into not-yet-but-hopefully-
someday-automated systems can also help us begin to understand how users 
are likely to interact with these systems.77 This would allow for important 
research on human-computer interaction that can proceed alongside 
technical innovations. The “Wizard of Oz” experimental method, developed 
in the 1980s for human factors research, similarly involves a researcher 
controlling a system that a research subject believes to be autonomous, 
typically in order to study some aspect of the system that can be examined 
 
 76. See Griswold, supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing the Capricity case in 
more detail). 
 77. Roboticist Wendy Ju uses this term to describe the Kiwibot’s human support 
operation. Said, supra note 56. 
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without a fully built-out system.78 Though researchers must always be 
attentive to the ethical implications of deception in research, such methods 
also permit much more rapid learning than would otherwise be possible.79 
But faux automation seemingly on its way to full automation can also be a 
fraudulent overpromise, as in the Theranos case. 
2. The second possible dynamic is that, ideally, a decision-making system 
would neither be, nor appear to be, fully automated—but at present it has 
the veneer of automation.  
Table 7: Unrealized Ideal—Manifest Humanity 
 Human is in the loop Human is not in the loop 
Human appears to be 
in the loop 
UNREALIZED 
IDEAL (manifest 
humanity) 
 
Human does not 
appear to be in the 
loop 
PRESENT STATUS 
QUO (faux automation) 
 
 
This dynamic gives rise to a different set of governance questions. In 
essence, are there benefits associated with making actually non-automated 
systems look and feel more automated? We suspect the answer is almost 
always going to be no, for at least two reasons. The first is a simple anti-
deception rationale; liberal subjects are entitled to know how the world they 
occupy actually works. Second, in decision-making environments that involve 
human judgment, we almost always care about which humans are entrusted 
to do the judging (and whom ought to be held to account for its outcomes). 
By necessity, a veneer of automation shuts that inquiry down.  
Here, a good example may be content moderation. One could argue that 
First Amendment principles not only counsel in favor of continued human 
involvement in decisions about what content is so offensive or otherwise 
harmful that it merits restriction, but also compel us to reveal that human 
involvement to users. Doing so is the only way to surface the reality and 
dignity of the human labor required to support a system and to govern 
appropriately around it.  
 
 78. Paul Green & Lisa Wei-Haas, The Rapid Development of User Interfaces: Experience With 
the Wizard of Oz Method, 29 HUM. FACTORS SOC’Y, 470, 470–74 (1985).  
 79. Westlund & Breazeal, supra note 64; Hartzog, supra note 36, at 793–96. 
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3. The third possible dynamic is that, ideally, a decision-making system 
would involve human input, but appear to be fully automated, making the 
faux automation quadrant itself the optimum.  
Table 8: Realized Ideal 
 Human is in the loop Human is not in the loop 
Human appears to be 
in the loop 
  
Human does not 
appear to be in the 
loop 
PRESENT STATUS 
QUO 
& REALIZED IDEAL 
(faux automation) 
 
 
We confess to having difficulty imagining cases that might actually 
populate this category and include it mostly for the sake of analytic 
symmetry. Nevertheless, it is possible that some cases do, or will, fall into 
this bucket.80 For instance—and acknowledging the relatively far-flung nature 
of these examples—faux automation might be appropriate in situations 
where human input is desired, but where the source or nature of the input 
needs to be obscured. By analogy, one might think of firing squads as a kind 
of faux automation designed to obscure the source of human input: no one 
can tell which member of the squad is directly responsible for the fatality 
(and traditionally, one of the squad’s rifles is loaded with blank cartridges to 
further permit each individual to disclaim moral responsibility).81 This 
phenomenon is also exemplified in per curiam opinions, a judicial practice 
designed to achieve somewhat similar effects. In per curiam opinions, the 
opinion is considered to be rendered by the court, not by any specific judge. 
While these are crude approximations of cases that would actually call for the 
kinds of faux automation discussed in this paper, they give us reason to 
believe such cases—where the ideal involves disavowing but nonetheless 
maintaining a “human hand”—might exist. So for the moment, we leave the 
question open. 
 
 80. See supra at Part V.A.3. 
 81. Hanny Hindi, Take My Life, Please, SLATE (May 5, 2006), https://slate.com/news-
and-politics/2006/05/merciful-but-messy-alternatives-to-lethal-injection.html 
[https://perma.cc/U3UN-T293]. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The age of automation is upon us. As more and more traditionally-
human tasks become the province of machines, questions of governance 
loom large. These questions will be difficult enough in settings where the 
status of automation is apparent. But they will become even thornier in 
settings where the actuality and appearance of decision-making systems are 
misaligned.  
In sketching our taxonomy of potential dynamics produced by 
misalignment, we mean to raise questions rather than resolve them. Put 
simply, the idea is that any time we are confronted with faux automation or 
skeuomorphic humanity, there will be at least two issues on the table. First, 
what kind of dynamic are we dealing with—in other words, what is the 
desirable end state? Second, how should we proceed within the context of 
that dynamic?  
Both questions demand public deliberation and democratic oversight. 
This ideal is not always borne out in practice, for many reasons: it is costly; it 
relies on often-scarce political will; it becomes, at times, functionally 
impossible. Our point is that democratic oversight always matters in 
principle, even when it proves difficult in practice, and that misalignment is 
risky in large part because it stands to undermine such oversight. In the case 
of skeuomorphic humanity, the worry is that we—in the sense both of 
individual affected parties and of the public writ large—will be lulled, by a 
false sense of familiarity, into passively accepting inadvisable forms of 
automation. In the case of faux automation, by contrast, the worry is that we 
(again, in both senses) will be misled about automation’s promise. We will 
not be able to coherently assess the costs and benefits of automation when 
its operation seems too good to be true.  
The upshot is not that skeuomorphic humanity and faux automation are 
always lamentable. Each may have desirable features that override concerns 
about deception in particular situations. But weighing the harms of deception 
against other context-specific values requires knowing that deception is going 
on in the first place. Not only is misalignment poised to sow confusion and 
alienation, it’s also liable, perversely, to thwart the very cost-benefit inquiry 
required to decide whether misalignment itself is permissible. 
Going forward, the question of when misalignment is permissible—and 
if not, what constitutes the proper remedy—will be complex and unlikely to 
yield easy answers. This does not make the questions intractable. It simply 
requires public deliberation and democratic oversight. The future of 
automation, including the interplay between reality and appearance, must be 
something we resolve together through policy—not something imposed on 
us.  
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